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THE FAM1LY CODE AND THE
CHALLENGE OF THE SEVENTIES
SOL

GoODSITT*

The Family Code, consisting of Chapters 245, 247, and 248 of
Wisconsin Statutes, laid the foundation for a structure that blazed new
trials in offering legal solutions to domestic relations problems.1

Because of modern social as well as legal trends in marriage and
divorce, new approaches and expanded horizons are called for. The author suggests expansion of the Code to include two additional chapters,

one dealing with "rights of married women," and another tentatively entitled, "Social and Economic Consequences of Dissolution of Marriage." The restructured Code would then consist of Chapters 245 to

249 inclusive.
Chapter 247, "Actions Affecting Marriage," is the mainstay for
lawyers, commissioners and judges in the family law field. Its pro-

visions, both substantive and procedural, have in the past adequately
served as a modus operandi for the commencement, processing and
termination of the actions therein described. Nevertheless, this chapter
is in need of revision to meet changing conditions and modern trends

in the years ahead. This article explores various suggestions and proposals for changing our outlook and our law relative to contemporary

standards.
Amendments to Chapter247
Since the enactment of Section 247.1012 there has been an ambiguity
involving the application of the doctrine of recrimination to a case in
which plaintiff, guilty of adultery uncondoned, petitions for divorce
or separation under Section 247.07(6) to (8).- Section 247.104 pre* J.D., 1933, Marquette Law School; Deputy Family Court Commissioner, Mil-

waukee County, Wisconsin, since 1965; Regional Vice-President of Wisconsin
Family Court Commissioners Association.
1 Under Chapter 352, Laws of 1969, a family Court Complex was created for
counties of over 500,000 (Milwaukee) population, effective February 6, 1970.
2 WIs. STAT. § 247.101 (1969). Recrimination, when applicable; comparative
rectitude. The equitable doctrine that the court shall not aid a wrongdoer is
applicable to any party suing for divorce under § 247.07 (1) to (5), except
that where it appears from the evidence that both parties have been guilty
of misconduct sufficiently grave to constitute cause for divorce, the court
may in its discretion grant a judgment of legal separation to the party whose
equities on the whole are found to be superior.
3 Wis. STAT. § 247.07 (1969) ; (6) Whenever the husband and wife have voluntarily lived entirely separate for 5 years next preceding the commencement
of the action, at the suit of either party. (7) Whenever the husband and wife,
pursuant to a judgment of legal separation, have lived entirely apart for 5
years next preceding the commencement of the action a divorce may be
granted at the suit of either party. (8) On the complaint of the wife, when
the husband, being of sufficient ability, refuses or neglects to adequately
provide for her.
4 WIs. STAT. § 247.10 (1969). Collusion; procurement; connivance; condonation; stipulation; property rights. No judgment of annulment, divorce or
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cludes the granting of an absolute divorce or legal separation to one
guilty of adultery not condoned, whereas Section 247.101 grants immunity from the doctrine of recrimination and comparative rectitude,
if the grounds for divorce or legal separation are other than those
specified in Section 247(1) to (5).5 The majority of family court
judges within the jurisdiction of Milwaukee County, giving precedence
to 247.101 over 247.10, have granted absolute divorces in these cases
because 247.101 is the more recent pronouncement of legislative intent regarding the application of recrimination to Wisconsin divorce law.
This ambiguity should be resolved by either the legislature or supreme
court. If the legislature or the supreme court decides to uphold the
immunity granted in Section 247.101, then the next logical step would
be to eliminate the outmoded doctrine of recrimination altogether and
substitute comparative rectitude.
In revising Section 247.07, and in particular Subsections (6) and
(7), the New York approach should be examined. While modeling
their code after that of Wisconsin, the New York experts in the field
of family law adopted a two-year minimum of legal or voluntary separation as grounds for divorce. This is a vast improvement over Wisconsin's present five-year requirement. When one considers that the
separation is followed by a mandatory one-year waiting period after
judgment, a five-year separation requirement seems unduly harsh.
In fact, the retention of the five-year provision has impelled the Wisconsin legislature to grant relief in the form of Section 247.07(8),
which makes refusal or neglect of the husband to adequately provide
for his wife a ground for divorce without reference to any minimum
period of time.
No discussion of new concepts in family law can avoid meeting
head-on the theory and practice of awarding alimony. The women's
liberation movement, with its stress on emancipation and equality, may
result in the denial of a prima facie right to alimony. What greater
legal separation shall be granted if it appears to the satisfaction of the court
that the suit has been brought by collusion, and no judgment of divorce
or legal separation shall be granted if it likewise appears that the plaintiff
has procured or connived at the offense charged, or has condoned it, or has
been guilty of adultery not condoned; but the parties may, subject to the
approval of the court, stipulate for a division of estate, for alimony, or for
the support of children, in case a divorce or legal separation is granted or a
marriage annulled.

5WIs. STAT. § 247.07 (1) to (5). (1) For adultery. (2) When either party,
subsequent to the marriage, has been sentenced and committed to imprisonment for 3 years or more; and no pardon granted after a divorce for that

cause shall restore the party sentenced to his or her conjugal rights. (3) For
the wilful desertion of one party by the other for the term of one year
next preceding the commencement of the action. (4) When the treatment
of one spouse by the other has been cruel and inhuman, whether practiced
by using personal violence or by any other means. (15) When the husband

or wife shall have been a habitual drunkard for the space of one year
immediately preceding the commencement of the action.
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symbol of discrimination and inequality on the basis of sex alone than
the almost sacrosanct "meal ticket" doctrine. If the feminist movement
is to flourish, the advocates of the equal rights amendment to the Federal Constitution to prevail, the open-door policy of employment to both
sexes to be implemented and the differences in rates of pay minimized
or abolished, should the whole institution of alimony be immune to
to challenge and change? The term itself has become almost opprobrious, especially in the eyes of the divorced men's counterparts to the
women's liberation groups, so that a substitute such as maintenance or
support might be more generally acceptable. Such a substitution would
tend to broaden alimony's application to both spouses and at the same
time limit it to either one on the basis of need instead of tradition.
In most cases, the former husband remarries. Usually he is financially unable to support two families. The court has continuing jurisdiction over the parties, under Section 247.25,6 to alter or revise the
judgment concerning maintenance. If the court should determine, many
years after the divorce, that the wife requires an increase in her allowance, the rule of reason dictates that it would be unfair to reopen the
divorce judgment and thrust an even greater financial burden on the
former husband and his present family. Perhaps the community is
morally obligated and financially better able to assume such increase.
Complete removal of alimony or its equivalent from the stockpile
of bills of the remarried male is the goal of every property settlement
and division of estate. Such a provision "in lieu of alimony" should
be made whenever possible. This would set reasonable limitations, both
dollar-wise and time-wise, on the husband's liability and free the wife
to augment her income without fear of reduction in alimony.
Further consideration of the women's liberation attitude raises even
deeper questions regarding alimony as presently implemented. Traditionally, alimony deems the husband sole payor and the wife sole payee.
If removal of all discrimination between men and women is to be accomplished, a re-evaluation of present practices in awarding alimony
is necessary. The broadening of women's employment opportunities
and the increasing of their net earnings will put them in a position
to assume the new role of payor. Such a position would be perfectly
justified, especially where the husband has encountered sickness, accident, or financial reverses. It is true that some leaders of the liberation
movement are aware of its possible damage to long held notions of who
pays and who receives in divorce, but it is doubtful that the followers
§ 247.25 (1969). Revision of judgment. The court may from time
to time afterwards, on the petition of either of the parties and upon notice
to the family court commissioner, revise and alter such judgment concerning
the care, custody, maintenance and education of any of the children, and
make a new judgment concerning the same as the circumstances of the parents
and the benefit of the children shall require.
WIs. STAT.
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have been similarly foresighted. In any event, the die is now cast, and
the momentum the movement has generated for a re-evaluation of all
aspects of marriage and its dissolution will inexorably affect the respective rights and duties, financial and otherwise, of the marriage partners toward each other. It should not be assumed that the doctrine
of alimony, support or maintenance will emerge unscathed from the
tumult nor that it should.
One way in which a more realistic approach to the financial problems created by divorce can be achieved is through modification of
Section 247.267 The monetary obligations of the husband include not
only alimony but possible child support, house mortgage and other lien
payments, outstanding debts as of the date of commencement of the
action, and contribution to his wife's attorney's fees, in addition to his
own. To these outlays arising out of the dissolution, must be added the
man's personal living expenses until remarriage. If he remarries, and
he usually does, he is confronted with the almost insurmountable burden
of maintaining two families, either wholly or partially. If he is under
order of judgment to support children, the man is required under Section 245.10 to seek permission to remarry at which time both he and
his fiancee are admonished that the obligation to support the child or
children of the prior marriage will be superior to any incurred as a
result of the subsequent marriage. Nevertheless, we must recognize that
for the average wage earner, who remarries, it is a constant struggle
to meet the child support obligations of his prior marriage, let alone
alimony for the former spouse, and such other financial commitments
of the new undertaking as will inevitably arise.
Because so many men are unable to meet these multiple financial
responsibilities, enforcement of court orders has become a difficult task.
The success of any enforcement project requires a realistic approach
to the problem of harmonizing the man's financial obligations with his
present and potential income. In order to concentrate on child support,
and to avoid arrearages, findings of contempt and penalties the burden
§ 247.26 (1969). Alimony, property division. Upon every judgment
of divorce or legal separation for any cause excepting that of adultery committed by the wife, the court may, subject to § 247.20, further adjudge to the
wife such alimony out of the property or income of the husband, for her
support and maintenance, and such allowance for the support, maintenance
and education of the minor children committed to her care and custody as
it deems just and reasonable. The court may also finally divide and distribute
the estate, both real and personal, of the husband, and so much of the estate
of the wife as has beenderived from the husband, between the parties and
divest and transfer the title of any thereof accordingly, after having given
due regard to the legal and equitable rights of each party, the ability of the
husband, the special estate of the wife, the character and situation of the
parties and all the circumstances of the case; but no such final division shall
impair the power of the court in respect to revision of allowances for minor
children under § 247.25. A certified copy of such judgment which affects title
to real estate shall be recorded in the office of the register of deeds of the
county in which the lands so affected are situated.

7 Wis. STAT.
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of alimony or its equivalent must be minimized. On a long range basis,
both parties stand to benefit from equalizing responsibility in monetary
outlay so that it is not excessively burdensome to one nor unduly generous to the other. The parties generally are or should be capable of
caring for themselves. The revised Section 247.26 should require, whenever possible, a property settlement and division of estate in lieu of
alimony with the twin objectives of setting reasonable limitations on
the husband's liability and freeing the wife to augment her income.
Custody and Visitation
It is, of course, the minor children with whom the law and its agencies are most concerned. The experience of Family Court Commissioners in representing the state and the public interest in default
proceedings and in presiding over pre-trial and post-judgment motions
is that the parties to the action are prone to minimize the adverse
effects of the separation and to be unrealistic in anticipating problems of custody and visitation. There is a need for an infusion of
fresh concepts and innovative legal and sociological approaches. There
is a duty and responsibility to take affirmative steps to help children
to avoid trouble, to cement and smooth the relationship between child
and custodian, and between child and visiting parent, and generally
to assist in arriving at meaningful solutions to the highly personal and
emotion charged problems of dissolution of a family.
Our present Family Code does not give the court enough flexibility
in determining proper age limits for support, custody, and visitation.
A proposal to reduce the mandatory support, custody and visitation
requirements from twenty-one to eighteen is worthy of consideration.
Boys and girls reach physical maturity much earlier than their parents'
generation, thanks to the higher health and nutritional standards of
the nation. Eighteen-year-olds are subject to military draft, pay taxes,
may marry under certain circumstances, enter into contracts for necessaries, vote, go to college or enter the employment market. Is it not
actually a vote of "no confidence" to place young adults under an
umbrella of protection that for the most part they neither need nor desire? By lowering our sights and narrowing the area of concern, our
efforts could be concentrated on children up to and including seventeen,,
with jurisdiction reserved for children eighteen and over in cases of
necessity. Holding open custody and visitation at age eighteen, except
for unusual circumstances, would improve the character of the relationship between parents and child although financial support from one or
both need not be ruled out.
If a child is handicapped, retarded or is in college, or is for any
reason incapable of self-sufficiency, cutting off support at age twenty-one
seems to be too harsh for universal application, the case of O'Neill v.
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O'Neill," notwithstanding. In some instances when one or both of the
parents is financially able to sustain the burden beyond age twenty-one
they should be subject to mandatory orders to continue support.
Proposed Section 249
The author plots an uncharted course in proposing the adoption of
an additional section to the Family Code to be entitled "Dissolution of
Marriage-Its Social and Economic Consequences-Pre-Trial and
Post Judgment Relief-Aids to Enforcement of Orders."
The intent of the Family Code, to promote the stability and best
interest of marriage and the family is found at the beginning of Section 2459 and is a reminder to applicants for a marriage license. Failure
of the marriage and the breakup of the family unit, resulting in a
judgment of divorce, legal separation or annulment, brings suffering,
deprivation and want to parties and offspring with widespread repercussions to our social fabric and body politic. Counseling and education, public and private financial aid and other resources, including
community organizations, professionals and volunteers, must all be
marshaled and channeled toward meeting the problems caused by the
dissolution of family.
It is the author's belief that as a direct result of the high incidence
of divorce, certain economic and social conditions have arisen, among
which are the following:
(1) A tremendous cost in dollars, both public and private, of establishing and maintaining the apparatus of legislative, executive and
judicial branches, on all levels, to administer the business of obtaining,
enforcing and modifying a judgment of divorce, legal separation or
annulment and the motions incidental thereto;
(2) A deprivation of economic benefits to parties and children;
(3) Social stigma and isolation of the spouse and children resulting
from the breakup, with the attendant problems of maintenance of separate households, and emotional problems and adjustments to step-parents and stepchildren;
held that even
where a child is physically incapacitated and continues to reside with his
mother a court may not require the divorced husband-father to contribute to
his support.
Wis. STAT. § 245.001 (2) (1969) INTENT. It is the intent of chs. 245 to 248
to promote the stability and best interests of marriage and the family. Marriage is the institution that is the foundation of the family and of society.
Its stability is basic to morality and civilization, and of vital interest to society and the state. The consequences of the marriage contract are more
significant to society than those of other contracts, and the public interest
must be taken into account always. The seriousness of marriage makes adequate premarital counseling and education for family living highly desirable
and courses thereon are urged upon all persons contemplating marriage. The
impairment or dissolution of the marriage relation geneally results in injury
to the public wholly apart from the effect upon the parties immediately concerned.

s O'Neill v. O'Neill, 17 Wis. 2d 406, 117 N.W.2d 267 (1962)
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(4) Public Welfare for members of broken homes involving outlays of ten million dollars annually in state funds to support families
which have become indigent due to marital disruption, and an equal
amount from the Milwaukee County Department of Public Welfare
because of the arrearages of husbands and fathers in alimony and
support payments.
(5) A high correlation between juvenile delinquency and broken
homes.
(6) A higher rate of criminal violations among divorced and separated adults.
The present Family Code does not make adequate provision for
means by which to effect reconciliation of estranged couples, nor the
means to aid couples and their children in their adjustment to separation. Also inadequate are the present tools of the court for executing
and enforcing orders and judgments. The legislature, demonstrating
its cognizance of these shortcomings, created the State Council for
Home and Family.10 This council, consisting of legislators and their
appointees, is primarily fact finding in nature. It issues a semi-annual
report to the legislative council, the legislature, the governor and the
supreme court. One of its intended functions is to bring about a decrease in the number of divorces in the state through implementation
of its recommendations.
In order to give the courts more effective weapons with which to
combat the problems of family disorganization the author recommends
the following provisions be made in his proposed chapter 249.
Under proposed Chapter 249, this writer suggests that there be
created a Milwaukee regional branch of the State Council for Home
and Family, the functions of which would be:
(1) To provide pre-marital and post-judgment counseling for the
parties involved in dissolution;
(2) To aid reconciliation of couples during the one-year waiting
period following judgment;
(3) To coordinate action taken by the Department of Family Conciliation and the Department of Public Welfare;
(4) To cooperate with the Office of Economic Opportunity, the
Social Security Administration, and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in establishing a money-management clinic, which
would counsel the economically disadvantaged in such areas as deceptive practices, comparative shopping, consumer credit, and installment
buying; and
(5) To assist the economically disadvantaged in applying for aid
under the various public assistance programs offered, in order to maximize the amounts of benefiits available.
10 Created by Wis. STAT. § 13.53 (1969).

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54

In addition, this writer suggests that proposed Chapter 249 establish
publicly-funded credit unions which could extend long-term, lowinterest loans to the economically disadvantaged for purposes of liquidating alimony and support arrearages. Under present law, credit
unions cannot offer checking services, issue credit cards, write thirdparty checks for the direct payment of depositors' bills, or arrange
point-of-purchase credit. Proposed Chapter 249 would grant to publicly-funded credit unions the right to engage in such practices.
Also to be included in the proposed legislation is a provision for
the creation of an economic assistance office, which would be delegated
the duties of:
(1) Providing employment opportunities for divorced parents and
for children who are the products of broken homes;
(2) Providing access to child-care centers for employable mothers;
(3) Providing economic assistance to those who are unemployed
as a result of accident, illness, layoff, or strike;
(4) Providing housing for those who are unable to locate adequate
quarters; and
(5) Coordinating the needs of persons affected by divorce with
assistance available from such agencies as The Legal Aid Society of
Milwaukee, Milwaukee Legal Services of the Office of Economic
Opportunity, Milwaukee County General Hospital, St. Vincent de
Paul Rehabilitation Center, Matt Talbot Lodge, Inc., Milwaukee Council on Alcoholism, and Veterans' Administration Center.
Further, this writer proposes re-activation of The Family Court
Advisory Board of Milwaukee County. This Board, which could conveniently be officed at the proposed State Council regional headquarters,
would consist of chairman, two vice-chairmen, secretary, assistant secretary, and thirty-two board members who represent a cross-section
of knowledgeable citizenry in the community.
This writer, finally, suggests that, through the cooperative efforts
of the State Council, the Family Court Advisory Board, and the Family
Law Sections of both the State and Milwaukee Bar Associations, there
be conducted a public relations campaign to increase public interest in
the problems facing our Family Courts and to encourage stability of
marriage and the family.
Before being issued a license to marry, it should be mandatory that
people satisfactorily complete a course designed to acquaint the novice
with the ways and variances of the opposite sex and make known the
responsibilities and hazards of the new role being assumed. Such instruction might be offered by the church or be available in schools or
from qualified tutors authorized to issue certificates to be required by
marriage license clerks. It must be expected that some will go to
another state to avoid such conditions. When Wassermann tests were
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first ordered some temporary migration did take place, and when a
waiting period was legislated into the matrimonial procedure, it happened again. But Wisconsin is accustomed to being first in social legislation. There is nothing wrong with the present practice of trying
to re-cement crumbling marriages through reconciliation procedures
but the emphasis should be on prevention of marital discord.
The State Council for Home and Family
The State Council for Home and Family makes optimum use of
the state's talent in the fields of law, family legislation, religion and
social welfare. The membership is further testimony to the conscientious dedication of state leadership in these fields. The Council numbers seventeen members, four of whom are legislators. Judges, lawyers, clergymen and other experts in family life serve with them
without remuneration. Their meetings, held at least four times a year,
cover a broad range of subjects relevant to the problems of home and
family. Much of the Council's work involves the study of laws relating
to marriage, actions affecting marriage and the support of children and
other dependents. The Council examines the causes of family disintegration and the need for future programs, activities, services and facilities to promote a family unity. It is also charged by statute with the
investigation of the effect of divorce on public welfare costs and the
examination of Supreme Court decisions affecting family stability. For
the in-depth study of many of the problems, the Council also calls upon
the services of its consulting committees, which include the (1) Committee on Family Life Education and Marriage Counseling, the (2)
Committee on Enforcement of support in Divorce judgments and the
(3) Committee on the Economic Aspects of Divorce. The Council has
devoted much of its time and effort toward the study of legislation in
Wisconsin and surrounding states. Its subsequent sponsorship or endorsement of bills is designed to remedy some of the ills in state family
legislation.
As a further source of information and guidance, the Council organized the Consulting Committee on Family Life which has met ten
times since early 1966. Its members are some of the state's most dedicated leaders in education, religion and the social services.
The committee has sought the organization of County Councils.
These councils could promote homemaking, family finance and family
life education on a local level. The idea was one of the proposals of 1969
Senate Bill 176, sponsored by the Council. The bill proposed increasing
the waiting period for a marriage license from five to thirty days except
upon cause shown; requiring Clerks of Court to report monthly rather
than yearly on matters affecting marriage; and requiring a guardian ad
litem for minor children of parents in process of getting a divorce (Bill
176 failed of passage at the special session due to lack of time).
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The committee on Family Life also favors establishment of a state
family life center which would coordinate all agencies working in the
family services field. Such an organization could serve as a catalyst to
better define the purpose and goals of the separate groups and bring
more efficiency and accomplishment to these units.
In its concern for student conduct in the state's colleges and universities, the committee recommended that student groups be urged to
formulate and establish guidelines of social and moral conduct, selfregulation and sexual responsibility. It also urged the adoption of
regulations prohibiting the use of habit forming drugs, and adopted a
resolution based on these recommendations which was presented to
interested groups on Madison and Milwaukee Campuses.
Another bill, which is also a result of committee recommendation.
would raise the marriage age for girls without parental consent from
eighteen to twenty-one and also fix the minimum age for marriage at
eighteen. (This measure failed passage.)
The matter of enforcement of support in divorce judgments is analyzed in the report of its consulting committee, in the Second Biennial
Report of the Council. It recognizes that one of the state's seemingly
unsolvable problems has been the conversion of an order to pay support
monies into "bread and butter" on the table. Support orders are intended to place the responsibility for the family on the wage earner, rather
than the State. The report attributes the fact that the state now assumes
the support responsibilities for housands of families to inadequate enforcement and statutory shortcomings and reminds us that the Council
has tried since its organization to attack the problem.
As a result of committee study and recommendation the Council
sponsored Senate Joint Resolution 9, passed in 1967 urging Congress to
allow the release of social security numbers for the purpose of tracing
parents who are delinquent in support of minor children. Another
measure, Senate Joint Resolution 16, passed in 1969 sought strengthening of federal -law to make information available directly to county law
enforcement officials primarily concerned with enforcement of family
support. Both resolutions further called for making child abandonment
a federal misdemeanor.
In another action, the committee recommended broadening wage
assignment legislation for child support, to prohibit an employer from
using any assignment of this type as a basis for discharge or disciplinary action against an employee, by the introduction of Senate Bill 495
on May 1, 1969. This amendment won legiMative approval and is incorporated in the revised Section 247.232 Wisconsin Statues "Wage
Assignment by Family Court Commissioner."
Enforcement of alimony and support payments in Mivlwaukee County
family court actions is being buttressed by the current "Fugitive Father
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Task Force Project," initiated in March, 1970. The computerized system under the aegis of the representatives of the Family Court complex,
County Board of Supervisors, Clerk of Circuit Court, Budget and Management Analyst, Family Court Commissioner, County Department of
Public Welfare and the Sheriff's Department, is designed to improve
collections from a rapidly increasing number of delinquent payors.
When a man is 21 days in arrears in his payments, a computer detects
this and causes a demand letter to be sent to the payor. If he does
not respond in 11 days, the Clerk of Courts will request the Family
Court Commissioner to prepare and deliver to the sheriff for service
an affidavit and order to show cause why the delinquent father should
not be found in contempt of court. Current cases involving welfare recipients in 1969 and 1970 are being dealt with first in order to recover
a portion of the huge sums owed to Milwaukee County and to instill
promptness and regularity in the payments from the start. After some
experience with the system, it is anticipated that it will be extended to
cases which are up to 120 days or more in arrears.
Closely associated with the enforcement of support orders are the
problems relating to alleged inequities in domestic relations practices in
the state. The Council For Home and Family organized a group which
has concentrated on possible statutory changes regarding alimony, child
support, trusts, temporary orders of family court commissioners and
related matters. Democracy in action was fostered by the group's investigation through a series of three public hearings held in Milwaukee,
Portage and Oshkosh. Thus, area residents were given an opportunity
to express their grievances with the state's divorce laws and more than
one hundred persons offered opinions and indicated direction new legislation should take.
Regulation of Remarriages
The idea that remarriage of divorced persons could be subject to
permission of the court upon fulfillment of certain pre-conditions was a
new concept in 1959. The idea was considered a reasonable regulation
of individual rights consonant with sound public policy and was incorporated in Section 245.10.11 The application of this section to non§ 245.10 (1969). Permission of court required for certain marriages. (1) No Wisconsin resident having minor issue not in his custody and
which he is under obligation to support by any court order or judgment, may
marry in this state or elsewhere, without the order of either the court of this
state which granted such judgment or support order, or the court having
divorce jurisdiction in the country of this state where such minor issue resides or where the marriage license application is made. No marriage license
shall be issued to any such person except upon court order. The court, within 5 days after such permission is sought by verified petition in a special
proceeding, shall direct a court hearing to be held in the matter to allow
said person to submit proof of his compliance with such prior court obligation. No such order shall be granted, or hearing held, unless both parties to
the intended marriage appear, and unless the person, agency, institution,

11 Wis. STAT.
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residents has been subject to judicial scrutiny beginning with Estate
of Feguson,2 which held that the phrase "or elsewhere" in the original
subdivision (4) was not a sufficiently clear manifestation of legislative
intent and therefore was without extra-territorial effect. As an outgrowth of this decision the statutory provision of 245.10 was amended
by Chapter 48, Laws of Wisconsin, effective December 31, 1965, to
read: "This section shall have extraterritorial effect outside the state
and Sections 245.04 (1) and (2) are applicable hereto. Any marriage
contracted without compliance with this section, where such compliance
is required shall be void, whether entered in this state or elsewhere."
It is noted that the crucial change lies in the addition of the simple
phrase "extraterritorial effect." On the basis of the decision in State of
Wisconsin v. Dexter H. M1lueller,1 3 we believe the high court not only
upheld the extra-territorial effect of the criminal sanctions of Section
245.10, but likewise upheld the extra-territorial effect of its remarriage
permission provisions, particularly, the highly controversial subwelfare department, or other entity having the legal or actual custody of
such minor issue is given notice of such proceeding by personal service of
a copy of the petition at least 5 days prior to the hearing, except that such
appearance or notice may be waived by the court upon good cause shown,
and, if the minor issue were of a prior marriage, unless a 5-day notice thereof is given to the family court commissioner of the county where such permission is sought, who shall attend such hearing, and to the family court
commissioner of the court which granted such divorce judgment. If the
divorce judgment was granted in a foreign court, service shall be made on
the clerk of that court. Upon the hearing, if said person submits such proof
and makes a showing that such children are not then and are not likely thereafter to become public charges, the court shall grant such order, a copy of
which shall be filed in any prior proceeding under § 52.37 or divorce action
of such person in this state affected thereby; otherwise permission for a
license shall be withheld until such proof is submitted and such showing is
made, but any court order withholding such permission is an appealable order.
No county clerk in this state shall issue such license to any person required
to comply with this section unless a certified copy of a court order permitting
such marriage is filed with said county clerk.
(2) No nonresident of this state, having minor issue not in his custody and
which he is under obligation to support by order or judgment of any court
in this state or elsewhere, may marry in this state unless he has complied
with the requirements of sub. (1).
(3) A hearing relating to court permission to marry for a father under
obligation to support his ellegitimate child may be waived by the court if the
court is satisfied that all requirements of sub. (1) have been met by the
petitioner.
(4) If a Wisconsin resident having such support obligations of a minor, as
stated in sub. (1), wishes to marry in another state, he must, prior to such
marriage, obtain permission of the court under sub. (1), except that in a
hearing ordered or held by the court, the other party to the proposed marriage,
if domiciled in another state, need not be pesent at the hearing. If such other
party is not present at the hearing, the judge shall within 5 days send a
copy of the order of permission to marry, stating the obligations of support,
to such party not present.
(5) This section shall have extraterritorial effect outside the state; and
§ 246.04 (1) and (2) are applicable hereto. Any marriage contracted without compliance with this section, where such compliance is required, shall be
void, whether entered into in this state or elsewhere.
1225 Wis. 2d 75, 130 N.W.2d 300 (1964). See also Korf v. Korf, 38 Wis. 2d
413, 157 N.W.2d 691 (1967).
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division (4). In Mueller, supra, a criminal complaint had been
lodged in Dane County Court against the defendant alleging that on or
about January 31, 1966, defendant, a Wisconsin resident, entered into
a marriage in Illinois, contrary to and in violation of Section 245.10 (4),
having been denied permission to remarry by the Dane County Court.
On appeal from an order of the Circuit Court for Dane County dismissing the criminal complaint on -theground that the statute upon which the
charge was founded was an unconstitutional effort to give extra-territorial effect to the criminal laws of Wisconsin, the Supreme Court
reversed. Justice Wilkie's decision held that the state can constitutionally
impose criminal penalties for failure to comply with the statutory requirement of court permission before marriage within or without the
state. The court distinguished the pre-amendment cases, and stated, "We
are of the opinion that sec. 245.10, Stats. and the penalty section, 245.30
(1) (f),14 are valid legislative acts."
The enforcement of section 245.10 (4) and its essential prerequisite are circumscribed in Hunter v. Hunter.5 In setting aside a finding of contempt against the support paying husband for having
married outside the state without permission contrary to the statute,
the Supreme Court differentiated between a mere recital of statutory
language in the judgment of divorce, in effect explaining its terms and
presumptively binding the defendant thereto, and the divorce court specifically ordering or adjudging in the judgment that he could not marry
without such permission. In the absence of such specific prohibition in
the judgment, the court held that the trial court had no basis for entering its contempt order. The distinction appears to split hairs but is
easily observed by the exercise of a careful drafting of findings of fact
and conclusions of law and judgment.
Rights of MarriedWomen
In our proposed restructuring of ,the code from its present chapters
245, 247, and 248 to 245, 246, 247, 248 and the proposed 249, wealluded only briefly to Section 246, "Rights of Married Women." Thefragmentary nature of its provisions affords untold opportunity for
embellishment and expansion. If this chapter were to be incorporated
in the code as a compendium of women's rights as they are affected by
marriage, its dissolution and the social and economic consequences
thereof, then some of the rational goals of the liberationists might well
meet with legislative sanction.
1344 Wis. 2d 387, 171 N.W2 414
14 Wis. STAT.
245.30 (1). The

(1969).
following shall be fined not less than $200 normore than $1,000, or imprisoned not more than one year, or both: (f) Penalty
for obtaining license without permission of court. Any person who obtains.
a marriage license contrary to or in violation of § 245.10, whether such license
is obtained by misrepresentation or otherwise, or whether such marriage is.
entered into in this stafe or elsewhere.
1544 Wis. 2d 618, 172 N.W.2d 167 (1969).
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A nonpartisan agency, and an arm of the state government, the Governor's Commission on the Status of Women, urged changes-in divorce
and family planning laws in its Third Major Report entitled, "Wiscon-sin Women," July, 1969. Its introduction, which Was the letter of transmittal to Governor Knowles, sets forth the four fields of concern: (1)
Family Law and Policy, (2) Health and Welfare, (3) Social Insurance
and Taxes, and (4) Labor Legislation. It explains that "within'these
areas we have reviewed existing Wisconsin law and policy and
have made recommendations for changes which in our judgment would
deal more fairly and equitably with women and men, would facilitate
the assumption of greater responsibility on the part of all our citizens,
and would more nearly correspond to the realities of life today. It is
impossible to fail to note that many of the recommendations in this
report are not new. They have been included in our two previous major
reports and in several instances have been before the legislature at least
once. While Wisconsin led the nation in 1961 in enacting the first law
prohibiting sex-based discrimination, it has lagged in the implementation of many current recommendations."
The Commission holds that both men and women are entitled to
equal rights in all aspects of life including marriage; that equal rights
based upon marriage as a full partnership are essential ingredients for
a stable family and will be reflected in the mental health, aspirations,
and values of the children. We are informed that there are several
patterns of family living found in Wisconsin, i.e., approximately one
third of the married women who live with their husbands are working
and contributing to the maintenance of the home; many other married
women work at some time during their married lives while others spend
their married lives in child rearing and homemaking. Wisconsin law
should reflect these varied patterns of family life and operate fairly for
both spouses in dealing with property rights, divorce, and the rights of
-children. To achieve these goals, the Commission recommends the
following changes in state laws:
(1) Property rights of marriage partners-ownership-Each
spouse during marriage should have a legally defined, substantial
right in the earnings of the other and in the real and personal
property acquired through these earnings and their management. In Wisconsin and in others of the 42 common-law states,
each spouse owns and manages his own income and property, a system which does not recognize contributions to the
family made by the wife who works only in the home and consequently does not have the opportunity to earn and acquire property in her own right. The adoption of the principles of communally held ownership would thus recognize the contribution of the
wife not employed outside the home.
It is difficult to grasp just what is being proposed. It is a misnomer
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to designate Wisconsin as one of the 42 so-called common-law states,
inasmuch as it is a code state from its very inception, taking the New
York State Code as its model for its legal structure in 1848. Do the
authors contend that the working wife will be better off if she must
divide her paycheck? Most married couples vest title to both real and
personal property in joint tenancy, with right to survivorship, although
individual ownership of either is permitted, with the wife, of course,
having dower provided by Section 861.0316 and other property rights
provided by Section 861.41.11 Community property is recognized as a
principle of marital law in a number of states, California being the
most prominent example. However, in that state material changes in
division of community property as well as alimony awards are expected
to follow California's liberalization and simplification of its divorce law
effective on January 1, 1970. The Commission also recommends:
(2) Division of property upon divorce: "Property accumulated
during marriage should be equally divided between husband and
wife at the time of divorce, but it should be subject to alteration
at the discretion of the court in consideration of unusual contributions not necessarily financial, made by either or both of the
spouses. Some factors to be considered are the economic dependency and age of the spouses at the time of divorce and the duration of the marriage.
Section 247.26 enumerates seven items to which the trial court
must give due regard in dividing the estate of the parties, although the
weight and effect to be given to each is not spelled out. In addition, the
Supreme Court in Wagner v. Wagner,"' admonished the trial courts to
give consideration to the following in making a division of the estate of
the husband's property and that of the wife's derived from the husband:
(a) Conauct which caused the divorce; (b) Age and health of the
parties, (c) The ability to earn; and (d) Manner of acquisition of the
property. It also must be remembered that the wife's contribution to the
estate must be subtracted, and then the balance is divided equitably.'0
While one third of the estate to the wife was considered a reliable
standard, as far back as 1914, the ratio first appearing in Gauger v.
Gauger,20 it was only a starting point to be increased or decreased according to special circumstances. It was further stated in the case of
Yasulus v.Yasulus, 21 that the division of estate is peculiarly within the
discretion of the trial coirt. More recently in Lacey v. Lacey 2 the
Supreme Court overruled the rule of thumb Gauger formula. Speaking
10 Wis. STAT. § 861.03 effective April 1, 1971
17 Wis. STAT. § 861.41 effective April 1, 1971.
Is14 Wis. 2d 23, 109 N.W.2d 507 (1961).
19 15 Wis. 2d 31, 111 N.W.2d 896 (1961).
20157 Wis. 630, 147 N.W. 1075 (1914).
216 Wis. 2d 249, 94 N.W.2d 649 (1959).
2245 Wis. 2d 378, 173 N.W.2d 142 (1970).
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for the majority, Justice Robert W. Hansen also reviewed the relevant
factors heretofore considered in the intervening two generations and
introduced new ones. Such concepts as shared enterprise or joint undertaking, full-time homemaker-housewife contribution, in addition to the
essential elements mentioned in the Wagner case, supra. The conclusion
derived from the Lacey decision is that the one third rule of thumb
is no longer applicable but the responsibility and flexibility of dividing
the estate is a discretionary power of the trial court to be exercised in
light of the prior mentioned elements. The broad range of considerations
enunciated in statute and case law in Wisconsin offer greater protection
and assurance to both spouses of a fair and equitable disposition of their
property than the extremely limited criteria suggested by the Commission as a reform.
(3) Alimony for self-supporting persons. Alimony as continued
support for an ex-spouse capable of self-support should be eliminated, providing there is sufficient property to divide under the
preceeding proposal to insure against hardship during a period
of adjustment and until re-education and/or employment. In any
case, alimony should not be awarded as a means of redressing
wrongs imposed by either spouse upon the other nor as a compensation for damage."
(4) Alimony for dependent persons. Alimony in the absence
of suitable property division should: recognize contributions by a
spouse not financially compensated in some other way; provide
recompense for loss of earning capacity suffered by either spouse;
recognize continuing responsibility for a specified period toward
a spouse in financial need. This period may be relative to duration of marriage and/or the time necessary for a financially dependent person to become self-supporting, if possible; provide
sufficient funds for dependent spouse to further his or her education or job training leading to employment at a level consistent
with potential.
The recommendation confuses an allowance for maintenance with a
division of estate when it speaks of eliminating alimony providing there
is sufficient property. In most divorce or separation cases there is little
if any property to divide-the liabilities frequently exceed the assets.
Current wages of one or both of the partners are almost the sole tangible
asset and since most families live on a paycheck to paycheck basis, they
accumulate very little in the form of wordly goods except those articles
purchased on time payments which invariably tend to become millstones
especially in periods of adversity such as sickness, strikes or business
recession. The award of alimony as a means of redressing wrongs or as
compensation for damages has not been the practice in this state. Alimony is predicated on the legal duty of a husband to support his wife,
recognized in the statutes and court decisions.2 3 It is in the nature
23 Salinkovs Salinko 177 Wis. 475, 188 N.W. 606 (1922).
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of a maintenance award, based upon need and ability to pay. Support
for dependent persons is a bedrock of family law. As to the efficacy of
the four specific recommendations the first two are puzzling as to their
meaning and intent. Items three and four reflect long standing application of present alimony law and practice with the additional features of
funds for the dependent spouse for education and job training, without
distinction as to whether the recipient be husband or wife, and for as
long as may be necessary for the dependent to become self-supporting.
Permitting either the husband or wife to be recipient of support or
payor, as the case may be, is constructive and worthy of study.
The Governor's Committee also made the following statement relative to grounds for divorce. "Divorce grounds should be made uniform
throughout the United States, thus eliminating the inconsistency of
obtaining a divorce in one state which is not recognized as valid in another. This uniformity would also discourage the practice of establishing
temporary residence in one state with liberal divorce laws to obtain a
quickie divorce. Divorce laws specifying various grounds should be repealed, with the standard decree to be based upon the sole criterion of
'irreconcilable differences.' Laws and judicial opinion regarding divisions of property should reflect considerations other than 'who is to
blame for the marital breakdown.' Eliminating 'showing of fault' would
cancel the doctrine of (1) condonation and (2) recrimination-the
countercharge by the defendant in a divorce of wrongdoing in the part
of the plaintiff as a defense against the divorce."
"Aside from the establishment of 'irreconcilable differences' or any
of the now existing grounds, a couple should be able to obtain a divorce
decree by living apart for one year by mutual consent. Nor should there
be any difference in the waiting period when suing for divorce between
the deserter and the deserted, but child support should be provided in
this as in all other instances."
The notion that uniform divorce grounds and laws generally on a
national basis would automatically solve the most irksome problems is
highly impractical and probably unattainable. The several states are
sovereign entities, highly jealous of their respective prerogatives and
diverse ideologies, based upon sectional, economic, religious and ethnic
differences. Even if such a goal were within reach, it would not be a
cure-all for it would mean sacrifice of cherished principles and practices
such as are contained in our own Family Code for the sake of an elusive
uniformity. That the "quickie" divorce violates both the letter and spirit
of our Code and constitutes one of the most flagrant examples of permissiveness in our society is undeniable. Wisconsin discourages the
resort to that panacea by its residents by express prohibition in sections
247.21 and 247.22, Statutes. In the former, "No person domiciled in
this state shall go into another state, territory or country for the pur-

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54

pose of obtaining a judgment of annulment, divorce, or legal separation
for a cause which occurred while the parties resided in this state, or
for a cause which is not ground for annulment, divorce or legal separation under the laws of this state and a judgment so obtained shall be
of no effect in this state," is a prima facie declaration of intent. In the
latter, subsection (1) provides: "A divorce obtained in another jurisdiction shall be of no force and effect in this state, if both parties to the
marriage were domiciled in this state at the time the proceeding for
the divorce was commenced," and (2), describes the nature of the proof
considered prima facie evidence that a person obtaining a divorce in
another jurisdiction was domiciled in this state. On the other hand, both
sections recognize constitutional and U.S. Supreme Court sanction of
foreign decrees, comity of states and the Uniform Divorce Recognition
Act, as they may apply generally to judgments of dissolution of marriage
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction.
To resolve apparent inconsistencies in statutory provisions as well
as an answer to the often repeated query, "is a Nevada or Mexican
divorce valid," we turn to two Wisconsin Supreme Court decisions:
Hartenstein v. Hartenstein,4 and Estate of Gibson.25 In the first,
the Court upheld a Nevada divorce involving two Wisconsin residents
where the plaintiff wife appeared in person and by her attorney, and
the defendant husband appeared generally by his attorney. In the
second, under a different set of facts wherein the plaintiff husband, a
resident of Missouri obtained a Mexican divorce against the defendant
wife, a Wisconsin resident, by personal service in a town where the p-rties had lived for several years, the divorce decree was held to be invalid.
Family Court Commissioner Joseph Syman in his article "Wisconsin
and Foreign Court Jurisdiction over Divorce," published in the Milwaukee Bar Association Gavel, issue of June, 1963, treats the subject
exhaustively based on the Hartensteindecision. The facts, the pleadings,
the issues and the contentions of not only the parties to the divorce but
those of the husband's successor wife who was named as party defendant in the action to vacate the judgment, served as the foundation for
an in-depth analysis of the decision written by Justice Currie. Weighty
considerations leading to the decision and its rationale include domicile,
full faith and credit, res judicata, collateral attack, fraud and coercion,
the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic fraud, and finally, the
relationship between U.S. Supreme Court decisions and certain provisions of the Uniform Divorce Recognition Act and their applicability
to the instant case. The ruling in Gibson, which denied the validity of
a Mexican divorce, relies on some of the principles enumerated in
Hartenstein,but in addition, on those factors peculiar to its distingnish2418 Wis. 2d 505, 118 N.W.2d 881 (1963).
25 7 Wis. 2d 506, 96 N.W.2d 859 (1959).
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ing features, principally that both spouses were not domiciled in Wisconsin, and that the divorce granting jurisdiction was a foreign country
instead of a state. Whereas, the Nevada divorce was upheld largely
because of the full faith and credit and immunity from collateral attack
doctrines, the Mexican divorce was upset chiefly on domicile and the
conflict-of-law rules of the domiciliary state. Surely, no rule of thumb
can be conveniently devised to justify advising the impatient Wisconsin
spouse to purchase a plane ticket to Las Vegas or Tiajuana, nor to calm
his understandable fears about the validity of a judgment so obtained,
fait accompli. Not only must the individual case of a foreign divorce
stand or fall on its own peculiar set of circumstances, but discretion
dictates a policy of extreme caution, if not a presumption of invalidity
in view of the almost insurmountable barriers posed by Wisconsin's
statutory prohibition and judicial selectivity.
The endorsement of the "irreconcilable differences" or non-fault
theory is not surprising in view of the growing number of adherents to
this modern trend in matrimonial severance. We shall limit our comment at this juncture to a reminder that the doctrine is in its infancy
and conclusions should not be hastily drawn. However, statistics show
an increase of almost one hundred percent in the number of actions
filed for dissolution in the first four months since the California amendment became effective on January 1, 1970, and thus shows the possible
effects of the provision. The results are diametrically opposed to the
intent of our Code to preserve and stabilize the family, and lessen, not
enlarge, the incidence of dissolution.
The recommendation of reducing the period of voluntary separation
from five years to one year is, in our opinion, in the right direction
but too drastic a step forward. Although we favor a moderate reduction,
two or three years appeals to us as a reasonable compromise. Professional marriage counseling should be made more available to every
couple before and during marriage. An expanded program could be an
effective agent in preventing family breakdown and divorce. The idea
is plausible but its implementation by choice and use of the particular
method, its cost, availability and sponsorship will require a considerable
contribution of time, effort, and money.
The Commission further urges that there should be no distinction
between boys and girls in age of majority or age to marry, just as there
is no distinction in voting age. We agree, this being in conformity with
the recommendation of the State Council for a minimum age 18 and parental consent requirements for both young men and women between 18
and 21. But we cannot agree with the Commission's Statement on
custody.
"When a marriage is dissolved, the custody of the children should
be determined according to their best interests, and neither parent
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should have a superior right to custody. There is also great need for the
enactment of a National Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act. In
today's mobile society the removal of children beyond the jurisdiction
of the court which determined custody and visitation rights frequently
defeats the interest of the other parent and of the child." The enactment
of uniform legislation is not a solution to all of our problems of enforcement, although we concede our opposition is not as emphatic as it is
toward a uniform dissolution of marriage code generally. Removal of
children beyond the jurisdiction of the state granting divorce does not
present the insurmountable obstacle to proper judicial determination of
custody and visitation disputes, at least in Wisconsin, that the proposal
contemplates. The parties may be warring and domiciled in different
states after judgment, but based upon experience with similar situations,
the law does come to the rescue and ample precedent is available. For
instance, it is established that jurisdiction of custody and support may be
exercised although not exclusively, by the court granting the divorce and
it also may be concurrent with that of a sister state, if the child being
supported is present, resident and domiciled in such state and the state
has a substantial interest in his welfare.2 6 Brazy v. Brazy,2 7 establishes
guidelines by cautioning that the Wisconsin court cannot review the
judgment of a sister state where the latter had jurisdiction of the subject
matter of custody and support, and personal jurisdiction over the husband by reason of personal service on him there, although the Wisconsin
as well as the California court had jurisdiction to decide such questions.
Thus, while the jurisdiction of the California court was not exclusive,
once it was asserted by the latter, the Wisconsin court erred in entertaining an application for a change in provisions affecting custody and
support. As corollaries to these principles, we call attention to several
other cases which help to clarify this area. The rule that the court of
either the state which granted a divorce or the sister state is free to
decline to exercise jurisdiction, and may yield to the other for reasons
of policy was enunciated in Hatch v. Hatch.28 Ordinarily, a court should
not exercise subject matter jurisdiction in a case when another competent court has previously done so.2 9 The court which granted the divorce
may be better informed, having resolved some of the original disputes,
and will generally be able to acquire personal jurisdiction of the parties.
A parent's right to custody of his children is a personal right and cannot
be affected in a divorce action unless the court has personal jurisdiction
over the parent. The full faith and credit clause of the U.S. Constitution
does not entitle a judgment in personam to extraterritorial effect when
Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 457 (1934).
Wis. 2d 352, 92 N.W. 738, 93 N.W.2d 856 (1958).
2815 N.J. Misc. 461, 192 A. 241 (1937).
29 14 AM. JuR. COURTS § 243 (1941).
26

27 5
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is was rendered without personal jurisdiction of the person sought to be
30
bound.
Legal Representation for Children in Domestic Relations Cases
The Commission applauds the Wisconsin practice of appointing an
attorney or guardian ad litem for children in divorce proceedings when
one is needed to represent the rights of the children as a third party and
urges that this practice become a statutory requirement and not merely
a voluntary procedure. It also urges that attention be given to insuring
that the services of a guardian ad litem are more than casual and that
this practice keep step with the purpose of protecting the children.
The guardian ad litem is required to be an attorney and his appointment by trial courts in child custody disputes is encouraged by a line of
cases beginning with Edwards v. Edwards,31 and sturdily reinforced in
32
Wendland v. Wendland.
But that the protection of a guardian ad litem was not intended as
indispensable to every case involving a child or children is evident from
the admonition in Wendland that "the appointment of a guardian ad
litem is a step that the trial court should take only in an extraordinary
situation where the trial court believes that what may be in the best
interests of the children may not be brought out by the two contesting
parties." We agree that the practice of such appointments merits wider
acceptance by lawyers and trial courts, since the enhancement of the welfare of the children involved amply justifies both the expense and the
enlargement of the judicial process in resolving child custody disputes.
In concluding its report the Commission observes, "The stability of
family life is of basic importance, and the traditional view is that to
achieve this stability a woman's role should be, either exclusively or at
least presumably, that of mother and homemaker. However, by limiting
them to these roles, many women suffer loss of self-esteem and even
retrogress in their personal development.... The availability of a range
of choice to Wisconsin women will create a more meaningful and socially useful life for both men and women ....
But recognizing that more
and more women do become involved in the mainstream of life outside
the home, men must at the same time become more involved in life
within the home to make marriage an equal and effective partnership.
. . . Marriages in which both husband and wife contribute within as
well as outside the home will serve to strengthen and stabilize the family
in a rapidly changing social scene." It is difficult to find fault with views
as eminently down-to-earth as those expressed in the conclusion since
for the most part they only reflect recognition of modern ways of life not
30 Supra note 27 at 361, 92 N.W.2d 738, 742-743.
319 Wis 2d 115, 100 N.W.2d 554 (1960). See also

528, 73 Sup. Ct. 840, 97 L Ed. 1221 (1953).
32270 Wis. 48, 70 N.W.2d 22 (1955).

May v. Anderson, 345 U.S.
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particularly in need of legal implementation. One is tempted to observe
that such an approach is a far cry from the type of extremism displayed
by some feminist equal rights advocates. What the Commission is really
saying is that today's woman should be free to either be a homemaker,
enter the labor market, or attempt a combination of both roles but
cautions gently that the men-folk had better beware. The latter will have
no choice but to tear themselves away from certain recreational pastimes and pitch in with the chores to fill the void caused by the woman's
exercise of "freedom of choice" to engage in other pursuits. Whether
the "silent majority" would actually endorse this practice by secret
ballot may be open to question, but there is an unmistakable trend in
this direction and it appears to be the wave of the future.
CONCLUSION
fhe concept of irreconcilable differences, the advent of the women's
flueration movement, and the changes in social, economic and moral
pailosophies, has afforded us a glimpse of the problems which may arise
in the Domestic Relation law in the next decade. Despite the sound basis
of the Family Code, challenges remain.
Conceivably, Mr. Justice Cardozo has contributed an answer when
he said:
"The inn that shelters for the night is not the journey's end.
The law, like the traveler, must be ready for the morrow." 33
It is hoped that this article has provided some food for thought
and has assisted in providing some solutions for the inevitable problems
which lie ahead.

33

B.
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at 20 (1924).

